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Jessica Lunsford’s father awoke on 
February 24, 2005 to discover his nine-year-old 
daughter was missing. John Couey, Jessica’s 
neighbor, had entered their home at 1:00 AM 
the previous night and abducted the little girl. 
After sexually assaulting her, he dug a hole and 
buried her alive. A forty-nine-year-old 
homeless man, Brian Mitchell, abducted 
fifteen-year-old Elizabeth Smart at knifepoint 
from her bedroom in an affluent district of Salt 
Lake City. She was found after nine months of 
sexual abuse, deprivation, and threats to her 
life. The scruffy drifter was arrested and awaits 
trial.  
In recent months, newscasters have 
brought the images of these unshaven, dirty 
predators and their fair, sweet victims into our 
households. Now imagine that these predators 
are attractive young women in business suits 
and heels and their victims are rowdy little boys 
in baggy clothes. Impossible? Perhaps most 
people think so. Why is it that we envision the 
prototypical child molester as one of the men 
represented above? Why is that we envision the 
prototypical sexual abuse victim as a fragile 
little girl? 
Child Sexual Abuse 
Child sexual abuse is a heinous act 
endured by 100,000 to 500,000 children in 
the United States every year (Maes & 
Baum, 2001). Child sexual abuse is defined 
as any act on an individual 18 years or 
younger by an adult that includes, but is not 
limited to, attempted and or completed 
intercourse, inappropriate touching or 
kissing, photographing a child sexually, or 
by exhibiting sexual body parts to a child 
(Fieldman & Crespi, 2002). The prevalence 
of cases of child sexual abuse varies to 
some degree because individuals define 
sexual abuse differently. Consequently, 
some instances of child sexual abuse may 
not be identified because the victims did not 
consider the behaviors perpetrated upon 
them to be abusive and interviewers’ 
questions were not specific enough (e.g., 
about a behavior) to eliminate interpretation 
(Finkelhor, Hotaling, Lewis & Smith, 
1990).  
 Child sexual abuse has many 
consequences for those children involved. 
One of the most common consequences is 
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) 
including symptoms such as hypervigilance, 
sleep disturbances, flashbacks, and 
restricted affect (Kendall-Tackett, Williams, 
& Finkelhor, 1993). In addition to 
symptoms of PTSD, children show 
withdrawn behavior, self-injurious 
behavior, and age inappropriate sexual 
knowledge and behavior (Kendall-Tackett 
et al., 1993). These consequences are more 
prevalent in some age groups than in other 
age groups. PTSD is the most common 
consequence for pre-school age children. 
Fear, nightmares, and school issues are the 
most common consequences for school age 
children. Depression and suicidal or self-
injurious behavior are the most common 
consequences for adolescents (Kendall-
Tackett et al., 1993). More severe forms of 
sexual abuse, such as incidents that include 
penetration, tend to be extremely damaging 
to a child and extremely likely to be 
associated with psychopathology (Kendall-
Tackett et al., 1993).  
 
Severity of child sexual victimization is 
defined by three primary characteristics 
(Kendall-Tackett et al., 1993). First, instances 
in which a child is penetrated vaginally or 
anally are considered more severe than are 
instances in which there is no penetration. 
Second, instances in which the perpetrator is 
psychologically and socially close to a child are 
more severe than are instances in which the 
perpetrator is not psychologically and socially 
close to a child. Third, instances in which force 
or threat of force is used are more severe than 
are instances in which force or threat of force is 
absent. Consequently, the severity of child 
sexual victimization may range from least 
severe (e.g., a child is coerced into letting an 
adult neighbor see her naked) to most severe 
(e.g., a child is forcibly sodomized by his step-
father who threatens to kill him if he tells 
anyone). Victims of longer durations of sexual 
abuse also tend to have more consequences 
(Kendall-Tackett et al., 1993).  
In addition to the previously mentioned 
psychopathology, victims of child sexual abuse 
are more likely to become perpetrators of child 
sexual abuse than are individuals with no 
history of child sexual victimization. Wilcox, 
Richards and O’Keeffe (2004), for example, 
noted that 72% of sexually aggressive pre-
teenage children had themselves been sexually 
abused. Researchers have found that 75% of 
females who are sexually abusive were sexually 
abused as children (Wilcox et al., 2004). 
Researchers have also found that 40% of males 
who are sexually abusive were sexually abused 
as children (Wilcox et al., 2004). Perpetrators 
who sexually victimize children are more likely 
to have been abused themselves than are 
perpetrators who sexually victimize adults 
(Wilcox et al., 2004). Transmission of sexually 
abusive behavior from one generation to the 
next is not, however, an inevitable consequence 
of being sexually abused (Cicchetti & Rizley, 
1981).         
 There are many misconceptions about 
who perpetrates child sexual abuse. One general 
belief is that males are nearly always 
perpetrators (Maynard & Wiederman, 1997). A 
belief that males will most often perpetrate may 
result in a lack of response from outsiders when 
a female perpetrates (Maynard & 
Wiederman, 1997). Another general belief 
is that victims are nearly always girls. A 
belief that girls will most often be victims 
may result in a lack of response from 
outsiders when a boy is victimized 
(Maynard & Wiederman, 1997). College 
students, for example, tend to believe that 
when a male child and female adult interact 
sexually, the interaction is not child abuse 
(Denov, 2003; Maynard & Wiederman, 
1997). College students reported that they 
believed that a male child is not scarred by a 
sexual encounter with a female adult 
(Maynard & Wiederman, 1997). In general, 
college students rated same sex sexual 
interactions to be sexual abuse more than 
they rated opposite-sex sexual interactions 
to be sexual abuse (Maynard & Wiederman, 
1997).  
Individuals also tend to believe that 
females do not possess the potential to be 
sexually aggressive (Denov, 2003). 
Clinicians perpetuate this belief when they 
report female sexual aggression as rare 
(Denov, 2003). In fact, it is written in 
several state laws that a female cannot 
commit an act of rape (Denov, 2003). 
Idaho’s statute on rape, for example, reads 
“rape is defined as the penetration, however 
slight, of the oral, anal or vaginal opening 
with the perpetrator’s penis …” (Denov, 
2003, p. 309). Given that a woman does not 
have a penis, it is virtually impossible for a 
woman to be charged with rape even if she 
has sex forcibly or if she penetrates her 
victim’s orifices with an object. As a result 
of these beliefs and laws, victims are fearful 
of reporting sexual abuse perpetrated by a 
female because victims feel that they are 
less likely to be believed or protected 
(Denov, 2003).       
 Although perpetrators may be male 
or female, perpetrators do tend to differ in 
terms of their relationship to a victim. 
Individuals known to a victim (e.g., 
biological relatives, family friends, and 
adults living in the female victim’s home) 
are most often perpetrators in cases where 
penetration takes place with a female victim 
 
(Carlstedt, Forsman & Soderstrom, 2001; 
Finkelor et. al., 1990). Individuals unknown to 
a victim (e.g., a neighbor, a bus driver, and a 
total stranger) are most often perpetrators in 
cases where penetration takes place with a male 
victim (Caelstedt et al., 2001; Finkelor et al., 
1990). The older a child is, the more likely it is 
for a perpetrator to be a stranger (Caelstedt et 
al., 2001).  
Females play an important role as 
perpetrators. The general public often likes to 
deny that females are also perpetrators of child 
sexual abuse (Denov, 2003). In a study of 348 
convicted male rapists, 106 of these men had 
been victims of child sexual trauma (Denov, 
2003). Of these 106 inmates, 42% of them 
reported that their perpetrator had been female 
(Denov, 2003). In a study of male college 
students, Fritz, Stoll and Wagner (1981) found 
that 60% of the male students who reported 
being sexually abused as children reported that 
the perpetrator was a female. Taken together, 
these and other researchers suggest that females 
may account for approximately half of the 
perpetrators of sexual abuse against male 
victims.  
 There are misconceptions that 
individuals hold as well about children who are 
sexually abused. Individuals tend to deny that 
sex between an adult and an older child 
constitutes abuse. Child sexual abuse is often 
seen as less abusive when a victim is an 
adolescent than when a victim is a pre-
pubescent child (Maynard & Wiederman, 
1997). Sex of the child also plays a role in 
whether a child or an adult is held responsible 
for the sexual encounter. Sexual interactions 
between a male child and a female perpetrator 
are seen as less abusive than are sexual 
interactions between a female child and a male 
perpetrator (Maynard & Wiederman, 1997).  
 Misconceptions about prevalence and 
harmfulness of child sex abuse may be related 
to the fact that perceptions of sexual abuse do 
not reflect the actual incidence of sexual abuse. 
Finkelhor, Hotaling, Lewis and Smith (1990) 
conducted a national survey collecting data on 
child sexual abuse. A random sampling was 
conducted through phone interviews in which 
individuals were asked about their views on and 
experiences with child sexual abuse. Of the 
1,145 men and 1,481 women that were 
called, 16% of the men reported 
experiencing child sexual abuse and 27% of 
the women reported experiencing child 
sexual abuse. The average age that males 
reported being victims of child sexual abuse 
was 9.9 years old. The average age that 
females reported being victims of child 
sexual abuse was 9.6 years old. Twenty-two 
percent of the males and 23% of the females 
who had been abused reported having been 
abused before the age of 8 (Finkelor et al., 
1990).  
However, the actual incidence of 
sexual victimization of males may in fact be 
even higher than that reflected in court and 
medical records. Finkelhor et al. (1990) 
found that 42% of males who had been 
sexually abused had never previously 
disclosed this fact to anyone. The higher 
percentage of female victims than male 
victims may be due both to a higher rate of 
sexual abuse of females than males as well 
as the underreporting by male victims that 
reduces the prosecution of perpetrators 
against male children.  
Clearly there are many disparities 
between the actual incidence of child sexual 
abuse and the perceived incidence of child 
sexual abuse. Additionally, perceptions of 
perpetrators and victims of child sexual 
abuse do not reflect the realities of these 
situations. The percentage of sexual 
molestation perpetrated by females is higher 
than that estimated by individuals, and the 
percentage of sexual molestation 
perpetrated against males is higher than that 
estimated by individuals. The consequences 
of under estimating cases in which females 
perpetrate and males are victimized lead to 
inequitable treatment of perpetrators and 
victims. Why then is it that individuals are 
unable or unwilling to acknowledge cases 
that involve female perpetrators and male 
victims? One reason may be people’s 
reliance upon stereotypes. 
 
 
 
 
Stereotyping 
Stereotyping is an act of grouping 
people into categories based on characteristics 
such as sex, age, and race (Hilton & von 
Hippel, 1996). Inferences are then made about 
an individual group member based on 
preconceived notions of that group (Eagly & 
Mladinic, 1989). Individuals categorize 
members of groups based on a number of 
different characteristics. Because perpetrators 
and victims of child sexual abuse may be either 
male or female, sex stereotyping may play a 
significant role in how perpetrators and victims 
of child sexual abuse are perceived. Males are, 
for example, typically perceived as more 
aggressive than are females (Prentice & 
Carranza, 2002). An individual holding this 
stereotype of males may assume that a male is 
more likely to victimize a child. This individual 
might then assume that a male teacher is guilty 
of having victimized a child when a child 
makes an accusation of having been molested 
by a teacher.  
There is a natural need to place people 
into categories in the same way that people 
place other objects into categories such as 
knowing an object is a chair versus a car even if 
all cars and chairs don’t look the same (Allport, 
1957; See Fiske, 1998 for a review). Through 
the use of categorization, an individual can 
quickly determine the purpose of an object. 
Likewise, through categorization or 
stereotyping people, an individual can make 
quick judgments about these people. 
Individuals are not born holding specific 
stereotypes. Instead individuals acquire 
stereotypes by one of two means. Individuals 
develop stereotypes from first hand experience 
or from secondhand knowledge acquired from 
other people (Thompson, Judd & Park, 2000). 
Receiving information about another person or 
group of people seems to have a stronger effect 
of creating a stereotype than experiencing an 
event first-hand. A person who hears an account 
secondhand often has a stronger reaction to a 
stereotype than a person who is recounting that 
experience. A person hearing the story does not 
have all of the facts from the experience, but is 
instead basing judgments on the exclusively 
negative information provided secondhand. 
Thus a person hearing an account of an 
event is more likely to stereotype 
(Thompson et. al., 2000).  
Stereotypes also have greater impact 
when they are believed by a majority of an 
in-group than when they are not believed by 
a majority of an in-group (Thompson et. al., 
2000). An in-group is any group to which a 
person belongs. People are more likely to 
believe a stereotype when the stereotype 
comes from a person in their in-group 
(Thompson et. al., 2000).  
One reason people perceive 
members of a group as possessing the same 
characteristic may be due to the out-group 
homogeneity effect (See Fiske, 1998 for a 
review). In contrast to an in-group, an out-
group is any group to which a person does 
not belong. Differences in characteristics of 
out-groups as compared with in-groups are 
magnified and are relied upon to place 
individuals into stereotyped categories (See 
Fiske, 1998 for a review). In-group 
members are seen as having diverse 
characteristics while out-group members are 
seen as having similar characteristics. This 
view of out-group members as similar in 
characteristics is known as the out-group 
homogeneity effect (Thompson et. al., 
2000).   
 The ability to recognize one’s own 
in-group can be very important to survival. 
By placing people in categories, individuals 
can rapidly decide whether another person 
is or is not a part of their in-group (See 
Fiske, 1998 for a review). Thus, 
categorizing people becomes an automatic 
process (See Fiske, 1998 for a review). 
When statements fit a participant’s 
stereotype they can quickly make a 
judgment about the statements. The 
advantage then of using stereotypes is that 
stereotyping reduces mental workload (See 
Fiske, 1998 for a review). Stereotypes allow 
people to focus on other items in their 
surroundings without having to deliberate 
over the intentions, qualifications, or 
attitudes of other people who are present 
(See Fiske, 1998 for a review).      
 
 Stereotyping includes several different 
cognitive processes including information 
processing, memory, perceptions, judgments, 
and behaviors (see Fiske, 1998 for a review). 
Individuals utilize previously acquired 
information that has been assimilated into 
categories (e.g., sex, race, age) to make sense of 
newly acquired information (Macrae & 
Bodenhausen, 2000). When exposed to a new 
person or object, individuals rely upon their 
established stereotypes or categories to make 
judgments about a new person or object (Hilton 
& von Hippel, 1996). Individuals might, for 
example, hold a stereotype of women as 
communal, nurturing, and kind. When 
individuals encounter a woman they have not 
met before, individuals may perceive and judge 
this woman’s behavior to be communal, 
nurturing, and kind. Individuals are inclined to 
attend to, perceive, and categorize behaviors 
about a person that are consistent with their 
stereotypes (see Fiske, 1998 for a review).  
 Individuals relying upon stereotypes are 
inclined to attend to stereotype confirming 
information about a person and disregard 
stereotype disconfirming information about a 
person (See Fiske, 1998 for a review). People 
are then seen as more similar to a stereotype 
than they may in fact be because individuals fail 
to process individual differences (Hilton & von 
Hippel, 1996). Individuals, for example, may 
tend to focus on an individual woman’s 
nurturing behavior because nurturing behavior 
is consistent with their stereotype of women as 
nurturing. Individuals also tend to disregard 
information that is inconsistent with their 
stereotype. Individuals, for example, may tend 
to ignore an individual woman’s harsh behavior 
because harsh behavior is inconsistent with 
their stereotype of women as nurturing. By 
attending to stereotype consistent information 
and failing to process stereotype inconsistent 
information, individuals’ stereotypes are 
reinforced. The nurturing stereotype of women, 
for example, may become increasingly enduring 
(See Fiske, 1998 for a review).  
 Individuals relying upon stereotypes are 
not only inclined to attend to stereotype 
consistent information more readily than 
stereotype inconsistent information, but they are 
also inclined to process stereotype 
consistent information more easily than 
stereotype inconsistent information. 
Individuals presented with stereotype 
inconsistent information need to utilize 
cognitive effort to make sense of that 
information. They may discount or 
somehow alter the meaning of stereotype 
inconsistent information (Hilton & von 
Hippel, 1996). Confronted with a man who 
is tearful, for example, an individual may 
discount the possibility that this man is 
crying (i.e., being emotional) and assume 
this man has something in his eye. By so 
doing, an individual has made stereotype 
inconsistent information (i.e., an emotional 
man) stereotype consistent (i.e., an injured 
man). 
 Just as individuals relying upon 
stereotypes are inclined to attend to and 
process information differently, individuals 
relying upon stereotypes may recall 
information differently (see Fiske, 1998 for 
a review). Individuals relying on stereotypes 
recall stereotype consistent information 
more easily than they recall stereotype 
inconsistent information (Hilton & von 
Hippel, 1996). Suppose, for example, 
individuals held a stereotype of soccer 
coaches as demanding, loud, aggressive, 
and insensitive. If these individuals 
witnessed the interactions between a soccer 
coach and his team they might recall 
instances in which a coach yelled at his 
players on the field and might fail to recall 
instances in which a coach was consoling a 
player. In other words, a coach yelling is 
consistent with stereotypes about soccer 
coaches and therefore is recalled. A coach 
consoling a player is inconsistent with 
stereotypes about soccer coaches and 
therefore is not recalled.  
 Individuals also rely upon 
stereotypes when making judgments about 
people (see Fiske, 1998 for a review). 
Because individuals relying upon 
stereotypes process and recall stereotype 
consistent rather than stereotype 
inconsistent information when faced with a 
new person, individuals will make 
 
stereotypic judgments about a new person. 
Individuals, for example, when witnessing from 
afar a soccer coach consoling a female player 
may be more inclined to attribute this coach’s 
behavior to inappropriate intimacy with the 
child (i.e., a stereotype consistent behavior) 
rather than to attempts to comfort the child (i.e., 
a stereotype inconsistent behavior). 
 Individuals also rely on stereotypes 
when determining how to behave with other 
people (see Fiske, 1998 for a review). 
Individuals relying upon stereotypes make 
judgments about out-group members that justify 
discriminatory behavior. People who are 
stereotyped are therefore frequently the targets 
of discrimination. Because individuals may 
stereotype an adolescent boy as obsessed with 
sex, for example, they may judge an adolescent 
boy who has been involved sexually with his 
teacher as being a willing participant rather than 
victimized by an adult. They may then justify 
their discriminatory behavior in failing to 
intervene or report this case of sexual abuse. By 
engaging in these prejudicial judgments and 
discriminatory behaviors, individuals are able to 
“dismiss, ignore, or otherwise detach 
themselves from the targets of these attitudes 
and actions” (Snyder & Miene, 1994, p. 47). In 
other words, prejudice and discrimination serve 
as detachment functions.  
Stereotypes that are specific to this 
study of perceptions about sexual encounters 
between an adult and adolescent involve sex 
stereotypes. There are several stereotypes that 
are generally believed about males. Males are 
thought to be more agentic, competent, 
adventurous, and independent than are females 
(Deaux, 1995; Eagly & Mladinic, 1989). There 
are also several stereotypes about females. 
Females are thought to be more emotional, 
communal, nurturing, and sentimental than are 
males (Deaux, 1995; See Fiske, 1998 for a 
review). Additional stereotypes that exist about 
men and women are the perceptions that 
women are kind but not competent while men 
are seen as competent but perhaps not as kind 
(See Fiske, 1998 for a review). Both men and 
women are affected by these stereotypes in their 
everyday lives. Women who choose roles that 
do not fit stereotypical roles, such as being 
housewives or being employed in typically 
female jobs (e.g., nursing or teaching), are 
often viewed negatively (See Fiske, 1998 
for a review). Men who choose roles that do 
not fit stereotypical roles, such as being the 
breadwinner or being an athlete, are also 
viewed negatively.  
A person’s sex stereotypes may 
affect views about perpetrators and victims 
of child sexual abuse. A belief that males 
are most often perpetrators and that girls are 
most often victims is one way a person’s 
sex stereotypes may influence attitudes 
toward child sexual abuse (Maynard & 
Wiederman, 1997). These stereotypes may 
result in a person placing less blame on a 
female perpetrator than on a male 
perpetrator. Similarly, these stereotypes 
may result in a person being less 
sympathetic toward a male victim than 
toward a female victim. There is also a 
strong stereotypical belief that females do 
not possess the potential to be sexually 
aggressive. This belief may result in a lack 
of prosecution of females who do commit 
acts of child sexual abuse because law 
officials believe females are unable to 
commit such acts (Denov 2003). 
Consequently, victims of a female 
perpetrator are less likely to report sexual 
abuse because they feel they will not be 
believed. 
Not all individuals rely upon 
stereotypes to the same degree. Some 
individuals are more likely to process 
stereotype inconsistent information than are 
others. One characteristic that may 
influence reliance upon stereotypes is 
individual differences in the need for 
cognition.  
 
Need for Cognition 
Need for cognition is a person’s 
tendency to participate in and enjoy 
effortful thought (see Cacioppo, Petty 
Feinstein & Jarvis, 1996 for a review). 
Individuals who are high in need for 
cognition tend to want to think longer about 
a problem (Good, Hepper, Hillenbrand-
Gunn & Wang, 1995). They are inclined to 
 
seek and critically evaluate information. 
Individuals high in need for cognition also tend 
to rely upon central cues (e.g., logic of a 
message) when evaluating information (Perlini 
& Hansen, 2001). Individuals who are low in 
need for cognition tend to want to think as little 
as possible (Good et al, 1995). They are not 
inclined to seek and critically evaluate 
information. Individuals low in need for 
cognition also tend to rely upon peripheral or 
superficial cues (e.g., attractiveness of a 
message source) when evaluating information 
(Perlini & Hansen, 2001).    
Individuals high in need for cognition 
are more likely to pay attention to the logic and 
quality of an argument than are individuals low 
in need for cognition. Conversely, individuals 
low in need for cognition are more likely to pay 
attention to heuristic cues than are individuals 
high in need for cognition (e.g., Perlini & 
Hansen, 2001). Need for cognition, for 
example, is a strong indicator of whether males 
will or will not believe rape myths. Males who 
are low in need for cognition believe rape 
myths more often than males who are high in 
need for cognition (Good et al, 1995). Males 
low in need for cognition would attend to such 
heuristic cues as stereotypes of females as 
provocative instigators of rape. Males high in 
need for cognition would attend to such logical 
arguments as no woman deserves to be raped. 
This difference in attention may therefore 
contribute to why males low in need for 
cognition are more likely than males high in 
need for cognition to believe myths about rape. 
Individuals’ need for cognition 
propensity affects how group opinions will alter 
their attitudes as well (e.g., Areni, Ferrell, 
&Wilcox, 2000). Group opinions are often 
formed using non-complex arguments (Axsom, 
Yates & Chaiken, 1987). Since many group 
opinions are formed in this manner, group 
opinions are more appealing to an individual 
who is low in need for cognition than to an 
individual high in need for cognition. An 
individual who is low in need for cognition is 
therefore likely to be swayed by the majority 
opinion of a group. When group opinions are, 
however, derived through complex analysis of a 
situation, an individual high in need for 
cognition may be swayed by the group 
opinion (Areni et al., 2000). Individuals 
who are high in need for cognition are more 
likely to look for a complex explanation 
than are individuals who are low in need for 
cognition (Areni et al., 2000). For example, 
an allegation of child sexual abuse is made 
about a young male teacher of fourth 
graders. In a PTA meeting a group of 
parents, relying upon their stereotype of 
males as sexually aggressive, wants to fire 
the teacher without investigating the 
allegations. Individuals in the PTA meeting 
who are low in need for cognition are likely 
to agree with this group decision that was 
arrived at by relying upon heuristics. 
Individuals high in need for cognition, 
however, are likely to disagree with this 
group decision and seek more information 
that they can analyze. 
In addition to the complexity of an 
argument, individuals differing in need for 
cognition are affected differently by the 
quality of an argument (Cacioppo et al., 
1996). Individuals high in need for 
cognition tend to enjoy thinking about and 
analyzing an argument. They therefore 
would be influenced by the quality of an 
argument. Individuals low in need for 
cognition tend to avoid thinking about and 
analyzing an argument. They therefore 
would not be influenced by the quality of an 
argument. In fact, researchers have 
consistently found a relationship between 
need for cognition and argument quality 
such that individuals high in need for 
cognition are more affected by the quality 
of a persuasive argument than are 
individuals low in need for cognition (see 
Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis 1996 
for review). Individuals low in need for 
cognition use less cognitive energy when 
considering the merits of a recommendation 
than do individuals high in need for 
cognition (Cacioppo, Petty, Kao, & 
Rodriguez, 1986). Individuals low in need 
for cognition are therefore more likely to 
rely upon stereotypes when considering the 
merits of a recommendation. Recall the 
previous example of the male teacher 
 
accused of child sexual abuse. Suppose that the 
child accusing this teacher has given 
contradictory information that can easily be 
refuted. Individuals low in need for cognition 
are more likely than individuals high in need for 
cognition to be persuaded by the discredited 
argument because it fits their stereotypes that a 
male is sexually aggressive. Individuals high in 
need for cognition are less likely than 
individuals low in need for cognition to be 
persuaded by the discredited argument because 
they will have enjoyed analyzing the argument. 
In addition to being influenced 
differently by the quality of an argument, 
individuals high and low in need for cognition 
are influenced differently by the source of an 
argument (Cacioppo et al., 1996). Individuals 
low in need for cognition are more likely than 
are individuals high in need for cognition to 
rely on news sources that require little cognitive 
effort to process. Individuals low in need for 
cognition, having heard a new law has been 
passed requiring a background check for 
virtually every person who enters a school, may 
watch a television news cast to find out about 
the purpose of the law. They would find out the 
law was enacted in order for school officials to 
make certain no construction workers or other 
individuals working in proximity to the students 
has a criminal history. The individuals low in 
need for cognition might approve of the law 
given the reported purpose of the law. 
Individuals high in need for cognition, having 
heard a new law has been passed requiring a 
background check for virtually every person 
who enters a school, may look for news 
magazines and newspapers to read about the 
purpose of the law. They would find out the law 
was enacted in order for school official to make 
certain no construction workers or other 
individuals working in proximity to the students 
has a criminal history. But they might also 
analyze other factors such as the cost of the 
required background checks, the limited access 
to schools for parents who may not have had a 
background check, the difficulty in enforcing 
the law. Individuals high in need for cognition 
might disapprove of the law because, having 
analyzed the impact of the law, they might find 
it impractical.  
Individuals low in need for 
cognition are more likely than individuals 
high in need for cognition to rely on 
peripheral cues such as trustworthiness, 
attractiveness, or expertise of the source of 
an argument (e.g., Petty & Cacioppo, 1984; 
Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman, 1981; Petty, 
Haugtvedt, & Smith, 1995). When an 
individual is presented with a trustworthy 
source, that source is more likely to be 
believed. Specifically people low in need 
for cognition are more likely to believe an 
honest, trustworthy source than an 
untrustworthy source. Knowing that a 
source is trustworthy allows a low in need 
for cognition individual to believe an 
argument without evaluating the quality of 
an argument and relying solely on the 
trustworthiness of that source thereby 
expending minimal cognitive energy (e.g., 
Petty, Haugtvedt & Smith, 1995). When a 
principal, for example, assures parents that a 
teacher accused of child sexual abuse is not 
a threat to students, individuals low in need 
for cognition may be convinced that a 
teacher is not a threat simply because 
individuals low in need for cognition would 
think that the principle is trustworthy and 
therefore believable. 
Individuals low in need for 
cognition are also more likely to rely on 
extrinsic persuasion cues than are 
individuals high in need for cognition 
(Axsom, et. al, 1987). Reliance on extrinsic 
cues by individuals low in need for 
cognition may be because extrinsic 
persuasion cues require minimal cognitive 
processing. In the domain of child sexual 
abuse, an individual low in need for 
cognition is likely to accept extrinsic 
persuasion cues to evaluate what is 
acceptable behavior (Axsom et al., 1987). 
Some of these extrinsic cues may come 
from cultural stereotypes. Males, for 
example, are stereotypically viewed as 
pursuers of females in sexual relationships. 
Females are stereotypically viewed as the 
object of males’ pursuits in sexual 
relationships. By using cultural stereotypes, 
an individual low in need for cognition may 
 
conclude that males are more sexually 
aggressive than are females. 
Individuals low in need for cognition 
tend to be disengaged from issues that do not 
directly affect them. Individuals high in need 
for cognition tend to be involved in issues that 
do not directly affect them (Thompson & 
Zanna, 1995). Consequently, individuals low in 
need for cognition are particularly likely to rely 
on peripheral cues when an issue being 
considered is unrelated to them. In contrast, 
individuals high in the need for cognition are 
likely to focus on central cues when an issue 
being considered is unrelated to them 
(Thompson & Zanna, 1995). It would be 
expected then that individuals high in need for 
cognition would be more personally involved in 
a social issue such as child sexual abuse than 
would individuals low in need for cognition.  
People differ in how they engage in 
problem solving based on their need for 
cognition (Petty & Cacioppo, 1984). 
Individuals high in need for cognition enjoy 
tasks that require them to think and to problem 
solve. Individuals low in need for cognition 
prefer tasks that do not require them to think 
and to problem solve. Individuals high in need 
for cognition also prefer complex rules and tend 
to avoid activities that do not have complex 
rules. Individuals low in need for cognition 
prefer simple rules and tend to avoid activities 
that do not have simple rules (Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1984). Individuals high in need for 
cognition also tend to engage in personal 
problem solving more often than do individuals 
low in need for cognition (Cacioppo et. al, 
1986). Individuals high in need for cognition 
are therefore more likely than individuals low 
in need for cognition to consider how they can 
address such complex social issues as child 
sexual abuse even when this issue does not 
directly affect them. 
If individuals high in need for cognition 
are engaged in issues, prefer complex 
information, consider central cues, critically 
analyze information, and in general expend 
substantial cognitive effort, it is likely that they 
also generate a significant number of thoughts 
(Cacioppo et al., 1996). If individuals low in 
need for cognition are disengaged in issues, 
prefer simple information, consider 
peripheral cues, avoid analyzing 
information, and in general expend minimal 
cognitive effort, it is likely that they also 
generate a minimal number of thoughts 
(Cacioppo et al., 1996). Individuals high in 
need for cognition tend to generate more 
thoughts as well as more task-relevant 
thoughts after controlling for task-irrelevant 
thoughts than do individuals low in need for 
cognition (e.g., Lassiter, Briggs, & Slaw, 
1991; Verplanken, 1993). It is likely then 
that individuals high in need for cognition 
would generate more thoughts than would 
individuals low in need for cognition when 
considering how to manage a case of 
suspected child sexual abuse.  
If individuals high in need for 
cognition invest considerable cognitive 
effort in processing and analyzing 
information, then individuals high in need 
for cognition would also be expected to 
recall more information than would 
individuals low in need for cognition. In 
contrast, if individuals low in need for 
cognition invest minimal cognitive effort in 
processing and analyzing information, then 
individuals low in need for cognition would 
be expected to recall less information than 
would individuals high in need for 
cognition. In a meta-analysis, Cacioppo, 
Petty, and colleagues determined that 
individuals high in need for cognition did in 
fact recall more of the information to which 
they had been exposed than did individuals 
low in need for cognition (Cacioppo et al., 
1996). Individuals high in need for 
cognition in contrast to individuals low in 
need for cognition would therefore be 
expected to recall more information about 
an incident of child sexual abuse.  
If individuals high in need for 
cognition expend substantial cognitive 
energy processing and analyzing 
information and they are also able to recall a 
significant amount of this information, it 
stands to reason that individuals high in 
need for cognition would have an extensive 
knowledge base. If individuals low in need 
for cognition expend minimal cognitive 
 
energy processing and analyzing information 
and they are also able to recall a sparse amount 
of this information, it stands to reason that 
individuals low in need for cognition would 
have a small knowledge base. When it comes to 
politics, individuals high in need for cognition 
were more knowledgeable about presidential 
candidates (Cacioppo et al., 1986), more 
knowledgeable about consequences of electing 
specific candidates (Ahlering, 1987), and more 
knowledgeable about reasons for supporting 
specific candidates (Condra, 1992) than were 
individuals low in need for cognition. Wolfe 
and Grosch (1990) also found that individuals 
high in need for cognition were better able to 
perform on a trivia quiz than were individuals 
low in need for cognition. It stands to reason 
then that individuals high in need for cognition 
will be more knowledgeable than individuals 
low in need for cognition about other issues 
such as child sexual abuse.  
Given that individuals high in need for 
cognition expend substantial cognitive effort 
processing and analyzing information, rely on 
central cues, and tend to have a broad 
knowledge base about many issues, it is 
reasonable to expect that individuals high in 
need for cognition will make judgments based 
on the recall and analysis of existing as well as 
new information. In contrast, given that 
individuals low in need for cognition expend 
minimal cognitive effort processing and 
analyzing information, rely upon peripheral 
cues, and tend to have a small knowledge base 
about many issues, it is reasonable to expect 
that individuals low in need for cognition will 
make judgments based on heuristics such as 
stereotypes. In fact, judgments by individuals 
high in need for cognition tend to be correlated 
with thoughts generated by these individuals. 
Judgments by individuals low in need for 
cognition tend to be uncorrelated with thoughts 
generated by these individuals (Haugtvedt, 
Petty & Cacioppo, 1992). When considering a 
social issue such as child sexual abuse, 
individuals high in need for cognition would be 
likely to have a broad knowledge base as well 
as a desire to analyze information when making 
judgments about a perpetrator, a victim, and an 
interaction. In contrast, individuals low in need 
for cognition would be likely to have a 
small knowledge base as well as an aversion 
to analyzing information when making 
judgments about a perpetrator, a victim, and 
an interaction. In other words, individuals 
low in need for cognition would be more 
likely to rely upon stereotypes when making 
judgments about child sexual abuse than 
would individuals high in need for 
cognition.  
 
Hypotheses 
 After reviewing the literature on 
child sexual abuse, stereotyping, and the 
need for cognition, several hypotheses were 
proposed. First, participants were expected 
to report more negative attitudes toward 
male perpetrators than female perpetrators 
of child sexual abuse. Second, participants 
were expected to report more negative 
attitudes toward male victims than female 
victims of child sexual abuse. Third, 
participants were expected to report less 
negative attitudes toward a sexual encounter 
between a female perpetrator and a male 
victim than toward sexual encounters 
between a male perpetrator and a male 
victim, a male perpetrator and a female 
victim, or a female perpetrator and a female 
victim. Finally, differences in attitudes 
toward perpetrators and victims of child 
sexual abuse were expected to be moderated 
by the participants’ individual differences in 
need for cognition. In other words, 
participants low in need for cognition were 
expected to express more stereotypical 
attitudes about perpetrators and victims of 
child sexual abuse than were participants 
high in need for cognition. 
 
Method 
Participants 
 One hundred and seven participants 
were recruited to participate in an 
experiment titled Adult-Adolescent Sexual 
Encounters. Participants were recruited 
through the psychology department from 
undergraduate psychology classes. 
Participants voluntarily signed up to 
participate and were given a location and 
 
time to appear. Participants were given an 
opportunity to receive extra credit in their 
courses for participating in this study. The only 
restriction on participants was that they must 
have been eighteen years old or older. 
 This sample of participants consisted of 
69 female (64.5%) and 36 male (33.6%) 
participants. Participants came from a range of 
racial backgrounds including White/Caucasian 
(72.9%), Black/African American (13.1%), 
Hispanic/Latino (5.6%), Asian/Pacific Islander 
(2.8%), or other (3.7%). The majority of 
participants ranged in age from 18 to 24 years 
(73.8%). Approximately 76% of participants 
reported being single and never married. 
Approximately 81% reported having no 
children. Two participants failed to record any 
demographic information.     
 Of the 107 people who participated in 
this study, 107 completed the survey except for 
two individuals who did not provide 
demographic information. All participants were 
randomly assigned to one of four conditions. 
Written informed consent was obtained from all 
participants. All participants were treated in 
accordance with the guidelines of Ethical 
Principles of Psychologists and Code of 
Conduct (American Psychological Association, 
2002). 
 
Procedure 
 Participants completed this study in 
small groups of no more than ten individuals. 
Participants were informed of the purpose of 
this study as well as the possibility that they 
might find the topics of this study emotionally 
distressing. Participants were informed of 
alternative means of earning extra credit and 
their right to withdraw from the study at any 
time without penalty. Participants were assured 
of complete anonymity and confidentiality of 
their responses. Participants’ questions were 
answered to their satisfaction. Each participant 
signed a written informed consent form that 
was collected prior to distributing the surveys.  
Participants were told that they would 
read a scenario depicting a sexual interaction 
between an adult and an adolescent and then 
respond to statements about their perceptions of 
this interaction and those people involved. 
Participants were given one of four possible 
scenarios depicting a scene involving an 
eighth-grade adolescent (male or female) 
and a teacher (male or female) in which the 
adolescent was asked to perform and accept 
sexual acts. An example of a scenario 
involving a female victim and a female 
perpetrator is as follows:   
 
Mary, an eighth grader in Ms. Jones 
class, stayed after school for help with 
her homework. Ms. Jones asked Mary to 
help stack some books in the closet. 
While moving the books, Mary and Ms. 
Jones began to talk. Ms. Jones told 
Mary that she thought Mary was very 
mature for her age. Ms. Jones said that 
she thought Mary was very attractive. 
The teacher placed her hand on Mary’s 
leg and began rubbing Mary’s body. 
Mary watched silently. Ms. Jones asked 
Mary to lie down on the floor, telling 
her she would enjoy this, that it would 
feel good. Mary did nothing. The 
teacher continued rubbing Mary’s body 
and then slowly undressed her. When 
Mary was naked, the teacher began 
kissing Mary’s body, starting with 
Mary’s face and working her way down 
to Mary’s thighs. Ms. Jones performed 
oral sex on Mary. Then the teacher sat 
up and put Mary’s hand inside Ms. 
Jones’ slacks and asked Mary to rub the 
teacher’s body as the teacher had done 
to her. Then the teacher undressed and 
lay on top of Mary while she fondled 
Mary’s buttocks. Ms. Jones brought 
Mary’s face down to her crotch and 
asked Mary to perform oral sex on the 
teacher. Mary did as she was asked. Ms. 
Jones fondled Mary’s genitals as she 
continued to caress Mary’s body. Then 
Ms. Jones got up and brought Mary her 
clothes and asked her not to tell her 
parents what had happened. The teacher 
asked Mary that their relationship 
remain their secret. 
 
Participants were randomly assigned to 
read one of four versions of a scenario in 
 
which the sex of the adult and the sex of the 
adolescent were manipulated: male adult/male 
adolescent, female adult/male adolescent, male 
adult/female adolescent, and female 
adult/female adolescent.  
Using a 5-point scale, participants then 
responded to ten items from the semantic 
differential (e.g., good/bad) (Osgood, Suci, & 
Tannenbaum, 1957). Items were 
counterbalanced such that for some items the 
negative descriptor was on the right pole of the 
scale and at other times the negative descriptor 
was on the left pole of the scale. Scores for 
responses on items with the negative descriptor 
on the left were reverse scored so that higher 
scores on an item reflected more negative 
attitudes about the encounter. After reverse 
scoring, scores were summed and higher total 
scores reflected more negative attitudes than did 
lower total scores. In this sample, a Cronbach’s 
α of .80 was obtained in this study for scores on 
items from the semantic differential scale. 
After responding to statements about the 
scenario, participants were given the 18-item 
Need for Cognition Scale (Cacioppo, Petty, & 
Kao, 1984). Participants responded to items in 
the scale with a 5-point Likert type scale: 
strongly disagree, moderately disagree, 
uncertain/undecided, moderately agree or 
strongly agree. Included in the scale were both 
negatively and positively worded statements. 
Agreement with positively worded items 
indicated a high need for cognition (e.g., “I 
would prefer complex to simple problems”). 
Disagreement with negatively worded items 
indicated a high need for cognition (e.g., “I 
prefer to think about small, daily projects to 
long-term ones”).  
 Responses to statements where 
disagreement with these statements indicated a 
high need for cognition were reverse scored. 
Scores for responses on individual items were 
then summed and higher scores indicated a 
higher need for cognition and lower scores 
indicated a lower need for cognition. 
Participants’ scores on the scale were 
dichotomized into high and low using a median 
split. 
 Using the 18-item Need for Cognition 
Scale, Berzonsky and Sullivan (1992) found a 
Cronbach’s alpha of .91 for scores on this 
scale. Peltier and Schibrowsky (1994) found 
a Cronbach’s alpha of .97 for scores on this 
scale. Other researchers have found 
Cronbach’s alphas of .87 or higher for 
scores on this scale (e.g., Booth-Butterfeild 
& Booth-Butterfeild, 1990; Furlong, 1993; 
Kernis, Grannemann & Barclay, 1992). A 
Cronbach’s alpha of .84 was found for 
scores on this scale in this study.  
Positive correlations have been 
found between scores on the Need for 
Cognition Scale and scores on scales of 
other constructs of theoretical interest. 
There are positive correlations between 
scores on scales measuring individuals’ 
need for cognition and individuals’ high 
aptitude for college performance (e.g., 
Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) individuals’ desire 
for new experiences that stimulate thinking 
(e.g., Pearson, 1970) and individuals’ low 
apprehension regarding interpersonal 
communication (e.g., Wheeless, 1975). 
Correlations between scores on the Need for 
Cognition Scale and scores on these 
conceptually related scales are evidence of 
construct validity for the Need for 
Cognition Scale. Scores on the Need for 
Cognition are not correlated with scores on 
Bem Sex-Role Inventory (e.g., Waters & 
Zakrajsek, 1990), scores on the Need for 
Closure scale (e.g., Petty & Jarvis, 1996) 
and scores on the Need to Evaluate scale 
(e.g., Jarvis & Petty, 1996). The lack of 
correlation between scores on the Need for 
Cognition Scale and scores on these 
conceptually unrelated scales are evidence 
of discriminant validity for the Need for 
Cognition Scale. 
A series of manipulation checks 
were included on the questionnaire to 
ascertain whether participants correctly 
recalled the sex of the victim (Mark or 
Mary) and the sex of the perpetrator (Mr. 
Jones or Mrs. Jones) in the scenario they 
were given. Participants were also asked a 
series of demographic questions (e.g., age, 
race, marital status) as well as whether or 
not they had any children. Participants were 
also asked questions about their own 
 
experiences with child sexual abuse. 
Participants were asked three questions about 
their own sexual experiences before age 16 with 
any individual five or more years their senior 
(e.g., Another person, five or more years older 
than you, attempted oral sex, anal sex or vaginal 
intercourse.). 
Participants placed their completed 
answer sheets in an envelope to ensure total 
anonymity. Envelopes were then placed in a 
box away from the researcher. Participants 
received a debriefing sheet that provided them 
with information about on campus and after 
hour counseling services in the event that 
material from this study resulted in emotional 
distress for the participants.  
 
 
 
 
Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
 Descriptive Statistics. We performed 
a preliminary analysis of the data to obtain 
the mean, standard deviation, and range of 
scores for each of the measures (see Table 
1). We evaluated scores on each of the 
measures for skewness and kurtosis. Scores 
on the Need for Cognition Scale had 
skewness and kurtosis coefficients near zero 
indicating that scores on this scale did not 
violate assumptions of normality 
(Marcoulides & Hershberger, 1997). Scores 
on the ad-hoc measure of attitudes toward 
child molestation had skewness coefficient 
of -2.44 and kurtosis coefficient of 8.11 
indicating that the scores on this scale did 
violate assumptions of normality. For this 
ad-hoc measure, the minimum possible 
score was 10 and the maximum possible 
score was 50. Actual scores for the scale 
were a minimum of 13 and a maximum of 
50. The possible range of scores was 40, 
while actual range of scores was 37. 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics for independent and dependent measures 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Scale M SD Skewness Kurtosis 
     
Need for Cognition 60.94 9.80 -.14 .29 
Semantic Differential 44.24 6.05 -2.44 8.11 
 
Chi Square Analysis. We computed 
analyses for measures of Need for Cognition 
and sex of participant to determine if there was 
multicolinearity. Scores on the Need for 
Cognition scale were not significantly related to 
sex of participant, χ2<1, p not significant. 
Scores on the Need for Cognition Scale were 
not confounded with sex of the participant.  
  
Manipulation Check. At the 
conclusion of the study, we asked 
participants to recall the sex of the adult and 
the sex of the adolescent in the scenario at 
the beginning of the study. If in fact the 
manipulation of sex of perpetrator and sex 
of victim was effective, we expected 
participants to recall the sex of the 
perpetrator and the sex of the victim 
correctly. Participants did in fact recall and 
record the sex of the perpetrator correctly 
 
94% of the time and the sex of the victim 
correctly 94% of the time indicating that the 
manipulation of perpetrator and victim sex were 
effective.  
 
Main Analysis 
The predictor variable was need for 
cognition as measured by the Need for 
Cognition Scale (high vs. low). Other 
independent variables were sex of perpetrator 
(male vs. female) and sex of victim (male vs. 
female). This study was therefore a 2 (high vs. 
low need for cognition) x 2 sex of perpetrator 
(male vs. female) x 2 sex of victim (male vs. 
female) factorial design. The criterion 
(dependent) variable was attitudes toward child 
molestation as measured by the semantic 
differential scale. An alpha level of .05 was 
used for all statistical analyses.  
Recall the first hypothesis. Participants 
would perceive male perpetrators more harshly 
than female perpetrators. That is, participants 
would express more negative attitudes about 
male perpetrators than female perpetrators. 
There was not, however, a main effect for sex 
of perpetrator on attitudes towards child sexual 
abuse, F(1,106) = 1.49, p > .05. Therefore, 
there was no support for the first hypothesis. 
According to the second hypothesis, 
participants would perceive male victims more 
harshly than female victims. That is, 
participants would express more negative 
attitudes toward male victims than female 
victims. There was not, however, a main effect 
for sex of victim, F(1,106) < 1.00, p > .05. 
Therefore, there was no support for the second 
hypothesis. 
In the third hypothesis, participants were 
predicted to view a sexual encounter between a 
female adult and a male adolescent less 
negatively than other dyads. There was an 
interaction of sex of perpetrator and sex of 
victim such that the encounter between the 
female perpetrator and male victim were 
viewed less negatively than were the other three 
dyads, F(1,106) = 3.33, p < .07 (see Table 2). 
Therefore, there was support for the third 
hypothesis. 
 
Table 2. Attitudes Toward Sexual 
Interaction 
 
   
Perpetrator/Victim M SD 
Female/Female 45.07 4.06 
Female/Male 41.70 8.18 
Male/Female 44.27 6.14 
Male/Male 45.85 4.41 
 
Finally, the effect of sex of 
perpetrator and sex of victim was expected 
to be influenced by participants’ need for 
cognition. That is, individuals low in need 
for cognition were expected to report more 
negative attitudes towards male perpetrators 
than were individuals high in need for 
cognition. Individuals low in need for 
cognition were also expected to report more 
negative attitudes toward male victims than 
were individuals high in need for cognition. 
Additionally, individuals low in need for 
cognition were expected to report less 
negative attitudes toward a female adult and 
male adolescent sexual encounter than were 
individuals high in need for cognition.  
There was a three way interaction 
between sex of perpetrator, sex of victim, 
and need for cognition of participant, 
F(1,106) = 3.53, p < .06 (see Figure 1). 
Participants low in need for cognition did 
not, however, express more negative 
attitudes overall about male perpetrators 
than did participants high in need for 
cognition. Participants low in need for 
cognition and participants high in need for 
cognition expressed nearly equal negative 
attitudes about male and female victims. 
Participants low in need for cognition did, 
however, express less negative attitudes 
about female perpetrators with male victims 
than did participants high in need for 
cognition.  
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Figure 1. Mean attitude scores for high and low need for cognition participants as a function  
of perpetrator and victim dyads. 
 
 
Discussion 
In the first hypothesis, it was predicted that 
male perpetrators would be perceived more 
negatively than female perpetrators, this 
prediction was not supported. Males are 
stereotypically seen as more aggressive than are 
females. Crimes in which behaviors are 
stereotypical (e.g., males are more aggressive) 
are typically perceived as more likely to reoccur 
and more deserving of harsh punishment than 
are behaviors that are not stereotypical 
(Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1985). Due to the 
nature of the sexual encounter in this current 
study, participants may not have relied on this 
stereotype when assessing their attitudes 
towards child sexual abuse. Participants may 
view a sexual encounter as less of an aggressive 
act than they would view other types of assault. 
Participants may instead view a sexual assault 
as more of a consensual act than an act of 
aggression. If so, then participants would be 
less inclined to rely on their stereotypes of 
males as aggressive than if the encounter had 
been physical assault. In some previous studies, 
researchers have found attributions of 
responsibility for sexual molestation were not 
influenced by the sex of the perpetrator of 
sexual molestation (Maynard & Weiderman, 
1997). 
 
 
In the second hypothesis it was 
predicted that participants would perceive 
male victims more negatively than female 
victims. This hypothesis was also not 
supported. Previously, researchers have 
obtained mixed results for the effect of sex 
of victim on attitudes toward victims. 
Female victims have been stereotyped as 
provocative instigators of their victimization 
deserving of both sympathy and partial 
responsibility (Glaser, 1993; Howard, 
1984). In contrast, male victims have been 
stereotyped as sexual aggressors in sexual 
encounters deserving more of responsibility 
than sympathy (Malamuth, Sockloskie, 
Koss & Tanaka, 1991; Koss, Gidycz & 
Wisniewski, 1987). It is possible that some 
participants relied upon their stereotypes of 
males as aggressive and other participants 
relied upon their stereotypes of females as 
instigators. Consequently, the effect of the 
stereotypes may not have been apparent in 
this study because the two effects may have 
canceled one another out. In order to 
capture participants’ reliance upon these 
opposing stereotypes, it would be helpful to 
have participants record their impressions of 
those victims.  
 
The third hypothesis was supported in 
that sexual interactions between a female 
perpetrator and male victim were perceived less 
negatively than were sexual interactions 
between a male perpetrator and female or male 
victim as well as a female perpetrator and a 
female victim. In general, people tend to view a 
sexual interaction between a female adult and 
male adolescent as not being detrimental to that 
“victim” (Broussard, Wagner, & Kazelskis, 
1991). An encounter between a female adult 
and a male adolescent is typically not viewed as 
abusive (Maynard & Wiederman, 1997). The 
widely accepted attitude toward a female adult 
and male adolescent sexual interaction is 
consistent with cultural stereotypes in that early 
sexual behavior for males is condoned where as 
early sexual behavior for females is condemned 
(Belsky, Steinberg, & Draper, 1991).  
The fourth hypothesis received partial 
support in that low need for cognition 
participants’ attitudes about the sexual 
interaction were influenced by the sex of 
perpetrator and sex of victim whereas high need 
for cognition participants’ attitudes about the 
sexual interaction were not influenced by the 
sex of the perpetrator and the sex of the victim. 
Specifically, participants low in need for 
cognition viewed a sexual interaction between a 
female perpetrator and a male victim less 
negatively than they did sexual interactions 
between a male perpetrator and a male or a 
female victim as well as a sexual interaction 
between a female perpetrator and a female 
victim. In contrast, participants high in need for 
cognition viewed a sexual interaction between a 
female perpetrator and a male victim equally 
negatively as sexual interactions between a 
male perpetrator and a male or a female victim 
as well as a sexual interaction between a female 
perpetrator and a female victim. 
 
Limitations 
Although there was no support for the 
first two hypotheses, results of this study could 
have been influenced in part by the sample. 
Participants may have been different from the 
general population in that participants were 
from a sample of college students. Because of 
their desire to become educated, individuals 
attending college might be expected to be 
higher in need for cognition than individuals 
in the general population. College students 
involved in education must engage in 
cognitive endeavors in order to succeed. 
Consequently, a sample of college students 
may be higher in need for cognition than 
people in general. It is unlikely that 
differences in college student’s need for 
cognition and general populations need for 
cognition, if they do exist, had an effect in 
this study because a median split was used 
to dichotomize those individuals’ scores in 
need for cognition. Consequently, 
differences in need for cognition were 
relative to this sample.  
The results of this study could also 
have been influenced by the effectiveness of 
the manipulations. Sex of the perpetrator 
was subtly manipulated by changing only 
the form of address (i.e., Mr. or Ms.) 
Perhaps participants did not comprehend 
that the adult in the scenario was a male 
(Mr. Jones) or a female (Ms. Jones). Sex of 
the victim was subtly manipulated by 
changing the name of the adolescent (i.e., 
Mark or Mary) Perhaps participants did not 
comprehend that the adolescent in the 
scenario was a male (Mark) or a female 
(Mary). This explanation is, however, also 
unlikely because 94% of the participants 
recalled and reported the sex of the 
perpetrator and the sex of the victim in the 
scenarios correctly.  
Additionally, the results of the study 
could have been influenced by the measures 
employed. All of the measures used in the 
study were self-report instruments and were 
therefore subject to influences of social 
desirability. No identifying information 
was, however, recorded on any of the 
responses. Participants were assured of 
confidentiality (i.e., that no individual 
responses but only aggregate data would be 
reported). Participants, upon completing the 
surveys, inserted their responses into a plain 
brown envelope and deposited them in a 
box. It is therefore unlikely that participants 
felt they needed to answer in socially 
desirable ways because participants’ 
 
responses were anonymous and confidential. 
The Need for Cognition scale has 
previously been shown to be a reliable and valid 
measure (see Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & 
Jarvis 1996 for a review). In the current study, 
scores on the Need for Cognition scale 
appeared to be internally consistent as well. 
Consequently, it is unlikely that the way in 
which need for cognition was measured 
influenced the results of the study. 
The ad hoc measure of the dependent 
variable included a scenario modeled after a 
scenario that had been employed in a previous 
study (Maynard & Wiederman, 1997). Attempts 
were made to use a measure that already had 
been validated, but it was necessary to alter the 
scenario slightly to capture the information 
needed in this study. It is possible that the 
scenario did not depict a plausible sexual 
encounter between an adult and an adolescent. 
This is, however, unlikely because the 
responses to items about the scenario resulted in 
nearly a full range of scores.  
The ad hoc measure of the dependent 
variable, consisting of ten items from the 
semantic differential scale, was created 
specifically for this study. Therefore, the 
measure used may not have been valid. Scores 
on the ad hoc measure of attitudes toward child 
molestation were, however, internally 
consistent. It is therefore unlikely that the way 
in which attitudes toward child sexual abuse 
was measured influenced the results of the 
study.  
 
Future Directions 
In the current study the sex of the 
perpetrator and the sex of the victim were 
manipulated. A number of other characteristics 
of perpetrators and victims as well as 
characteristics of their relationship may 
influence people’s perceptions of sexual abuse. 
Maynard and Weiderman (1997) noted that 
individuals are more likely to blame a fifteen-
year-old victim than a seven-year-old victim. 
Additional research exploring the impact of the 
age of the victim on attitudes would be 
valuable. Other characteristics such as race of 
perpetrators and victims, sexual orientation of 
perpetrators, and socio-economic status of 
perpetrators and victims may also warrant 
investigation.  
Characteristics of the relationship 
between perpetrators and victims may also 
be valuable topics for future research. 
Parents are most often perpetrators of child 
physical abuse (Gelles & Straus, 1988). 
Individuals may therefore believe that 
parents are most often the perpetrators of 
sexual abuse. Individuals’ perceptions of 
child sexual abuse may also influenced by 
media attention focused on cases in which 
strangers have abducted and sexually 
assaulted children. It would therefore be 
important to examine the influence of the 
relationship between perpetrators and 
victims on people’s perceptions of child 
sexual abuse.  
Severity of the sexual abuse (e.g., 
use or threat of force, penetration) has been 
shown by other researchers to impact the 
victim (Kendall-Tackett et al., 1993). 
Perhaps individuals would have different 
attitudes toward perpetrators and victims of 
severe sexual abuse versus victims of 
moderate or mild sexual abuse. Future 
research examining the influence of abuse 
severity on people’s perceptions of victims 
and perpetrators may therefore be valuable.  
In addition to the influences of 
characteristics of perpetrators and victims as 
well as situational factors, individual 
differences in perceivers may impact 
attitudes toward child sexual abuse. In this 
study, research was centered on the 
individual difference in participants’ need 
for cognition. Differences in need for 
cognition did influence perceptions of child 
sexual abuse in this study. Other individual 
difference variables may also be related to 
participants’ attitude towards child sexual 
abuse. Need for closure, for example, is a 
persons preference for order, predictability, 
and lack of ambiguity (Leone, Wallace & 
Modglin, 1999; Neuberg, Judice & West, 
1997;Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). 
Individuals with a high need for closure 
desire stability and want knowledge to be 
consistent across situations and time 
(Webster& Kruglanski, 1994). A person 
 
who is high in need for closure is likely to be 
“closed minded” (Webster & Kruglanski, 
1994). This closed mindedness may be related 
to strong preconceived notions about what is 
and isn’t child sexual abuse, which may in turn 
be related to individuals’ attitudes towards child 
sexual abuse.  
Recall the cases of Jessica Lunsford and 
Elizabeth Smart. Now in contrast consider the 
following cases. Mary Kay Letourneau, an 
attractive middle-aged woman, was arrested and 
convicted of second-degree child rape and 
sentenced to seven years in prison only to have 
that sentence suspended. She managed to have 
two children with her adolescent victim. Or 
consider the case of Debra LaFave, a middle 
school reading teacher and former model, who 
was charged with lewd and lascivious battery 
and lewd and lascivious exhibition after 
repeatedly having sex with a fourteen-year-old 
student. School representatives expressed 
concern that because LaFave is pretty, her 
young male student will not be seen as a victim 
(CBS News, 2005). Her defense attorneys plan 
to use an insanity defense and justify her 
behavior by portraying her as depressed and ill 
since her older sister’s death a few years earlier 
(CBS News, 2003). It is hard to imagine that a 
case in which a middle-aged man had sex 
repeatedly with a child and bore two children 
with her would have resulted in a seven-year 
sentence. It is even harder to imagine a male 
schoolteacher having sex with his student 
would consider an insanity defense because of 
depression. 
Whether because of the stereotypes 
people hold or because of individual differences 
that are related to the use of stereotypes, 
healthcare professionals, law enforcement 
officials, and other individuals charged with 
protecting children do not handle cases of child 
sexual abuse equitably (Ajdukovic, Petak, & 
Mrsic, 1993; Elliott, Tong, & Tan, 1997; 
Marshall & Locke, 1997). This inequitable 
treatment leads to a lack of protection for 
children who become victims of child sexual 
abuse. Understanding why people treat cases of 
child sexual abuse in inequitable manners may 
help to change societal norms that will help 
protect children from continuing to endure 
this heinous crime. 
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